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Waves of Optimism and Pessimism
Beatrice Pataracchia∗
Abstract
We consider a simple consumption-based asset pricing model with
two types of investors who have access to the same observations but
who use different updating rules to infer information about the growth
state of the economy. In particular, we consider an optimistic and
pessimistic group of agents who use distorted Bayesian updating rules.
The aim of the work is to understand to what extent the interaction of
such distorted Bayesian rules can explain low and medium frequency
characterization of dynamics movements observed in the price div-
idend ratios and can give rise endogenously to waves of pessimism
and optimism which are associated with sustained asset price booms
and busts. The analysis shows that heterogeneity in ambiguity lov-
ing/aversion preferences appears to be an important factor to capture
medium-frequency waves observed on asset prices.
Keywords: Asset Pricing, Heterogeneous Agents, Optimism, Pessimism
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1 Introduction
Standard consumption-based asset pricing models have difficulty in explain-
ing many characteristics of financial markets. The literature has documented
typical puzzles implied by standard representative agent model with time
separable utility: the observed higher returns of risky assets compared to
risk-free investment, which could be rationalize only with an implausible
high degree of relative risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott, 1985), the un-
realistic implication of high risk free returns (Weil, 1989) and the excess
volatility observed in stock prices, which is difficult to replicate in mod-
els (Shiller, 1981). Such failures have motivated an important effort in the
financial literature to provide plausible explanations. One direction has fo-
cused on the representative investor who fears uncertainty about the model
used and/or tries to learn to resolve such uncertainty. The idea of knight-
ian uncertainty, precautionary behaviors and the need of robustness against
model misspecification, have been proposed as a possible explanation for
high returns of risky assets (Hansen and Sargent, 2005; Maenhout, 2004;
Anderson, Hansen and Sargent, 2003; Leippold, Trojani and Vanini, 2008).
Another stream has explored the implication of the interaction of heteroge-
neous agents and beliefs and focused on the conditions for long run survival
of the agents with the most correct beliefs (Blume and Easley, 1992; San-
droni, 2000). It is known that the interaction of agents with different beliefs
is able to capture some chaotic pricing behavior observed in data, such as
clustering volatility, bubbles and fat tails. From Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) an increasing stream of literature has focused on a computationally
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intensive approach based on the ”artificial stock market”, which consists
of simulating many interacting agents who can exchange assets repeatedly
in time. One drawback of this literature is the high parameterization on
which it relies. This naturally casts problems of estimation, validation and
robustness (Amilon, 2008, Li, Donkers and Melenberg 2010).
In order to overcome this problem, we consider a very simple model in
line with Sandroni (2000) who proposes a model where agents have different
beliefs about consumption growth’s realizations. He investigates the condi-
tions for the convergence to rational expectations stating that if agents have
the same intertemporal discount factor and the same utility function, those
who make wrong predictions are driven out of the market. Our goal is differ-
ent. We do not investigate long-run rational expectation conditions, rather
we want to study the implications of a long-run persistence of heterogeneity
of beliefs where all the agents have access to the same information. Such
simple framework allows us to study the effect of heterogeneity of beliefs
due to the disagreement in the interpretation of new information.
Disagreement caused by phsychological attitudes has been disregarded
by traditional economics who fails to take into account the extent to which
people are also guided by noneconomic motivations. Akerlof and Shiller
(2009) reasserts the necessity to consider the role of ”animal spirits” in eco-
nomic analysis. ”The idea that economic crises [...] are mainly caused by
changing thought patterns goes against standard economic thinking. But the
current crisis bears witness to the role of such changes in thinking. It was
caused precisely by our changing confidence [...] and especially by changing
stories of the nature of the economy” (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, p.4). The
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uncertainty about the unstable economic conditions after the severe 2008 fi-
nancial crisis has been an example of the relevance of this aspect: investors
were not wondering about the access of information or measurement issues,
rather they have tried to understand the underlying characteristics of the
economy, discussing about whether and when the recession period would be
over. Temporary positive observations do not necessarily resolve the un-
certainty: some analysts have interpreted them as a clear sign of recovery,
others were more cautious. In this work, we want to analyze such disagree-
ment in the interpretation of information and we study its effects on asset
prices. The heterogeneity in our context is characterized by the attitude
toward optimistic and pessimistic interpretation of the information.
Changing confidence in our model is represented by time-varying frac-
tion of optimists and pessimists. We impose distortions in a way such that
all the agents are equally wrong about future consumption growth realiza-
tions. In this way we preserve heterogeneity in the long run and focus on the
implications of the dynamics of prices. The consumption shares, and their
effects on prices, inversely depend on how wrong investors’ forecasts have
been compared to consumption realizations. With this simple framework,
we want to model the idea that investors do not simply have difficulties in
accessing information, rather they can interpret it differently, depending on
their personal attitudes. In particular, we ask ourselves whether this sim-
ple framework is able to capture the main observed low-medium frequency
movements in asset prices. Indeed, contrary to the hypothesis of informa-
tionally efficient markets (Fama 1970, 1991), which implies stock returns
close to being unpredictable and prices close to a random walk, a central
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fact driving forecastable long-horizon returns is that the price-dividend ra-
tio is far from being a random walk: it has persistent fluctuations and is
excessively volatile. A part from the macroeconomic idea that level and
movement of risk premia are important for understanding the business cy-
cle, the attention to price-dividend ratio is also motivated by the empirical
evidence that the price-dividend ratios appear to be able to predict substan-
tial amounts of stock return variation.
We show that introducing a very simple form of distortion of beliefs in
the way described above, can have a notable effect on the implied price
dynamics: heterogeneity of beliefs amplifies prices and fluctuations so to
capture and reproduce the medium-frequency waves of prices observed in
the data.
In order to analyze the sole effect of heterogeneity and to make the
interpretation of the results easy, we assume that the consumption growth
is modeled as a simple discrete regime switching process. Even in such an
unrealistic case, the implied price-dividend ratio is very volatile compared
to the distortion-neutral case and the dynamics of the implied fluctuations
are able to match, qualitatively, the observed fluctuations.
Finally, we show that testable Euler moment conditions can be defined
introducing only one additional degree of freedom and model parameters can
be estimated using a Generalized Method of Moments technique. We find
that estimates of the distortion are typically positive, but present very high
standard errors. Such failure, however, cannot be attributed solely to our
model as it is a common feature of simple consumption based asset pricing
models (Campbell and Cochrane, 2000).
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We conclude that the ingredient of heterogeneity among economic agents
remains fundamental to understand and forecast price fluctuations. The
additional degree of freedom is due to the fact that we allow agents to
have a personal and heterogeneous attitude in interpreting information and
exchanging assets. The agents neither learn nor do they imitate others’
behavior: they are just different in the way in which they interpret reality
even if they can share the same degree of risk aversion or the same discount
factor.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the model and the agents’ optimization problem. Section 3 presents a quan-
titative analysis based on the model estimates, focusing, especially on the
historical implied dynamics of the price-dividend ratio for different distor-
tion degrees. In Section 4, the testable model restrictions are derived and
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We study a simple dynamically complete market with two long-lived groups
of agents, two assets, two states of nature and one single consumption good.
Let T be the set of natural numbers. At period t ∈ T, the agents observe
the state of nature of the consumption growth process, yt = log
Ct
Ct−1 . The
set of states of nature is given by Y ≡ {yh, yl}, with yh > yl. The true
stochastic process of the states of nature is given by a Markovian structure
so that
log
Ct+1
Ct
= yt+1 = y(St+1), (1)
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where St+1 is a two-state Markov chain with associated transition matrix
P = {pij}2×2 where pij = prob [St+1 = j|St = i] , with i, j = h, l. In the
remainder of the paper, we denote y(h) with yh and y(l) with yl.
The investors can choose among two assets: asset 1 pays the aggregate
dividend Dt if yh realizes, and zero otherwise. Asset 2 pays Dt if yl realizes
and zero dividends if yh realizes. As standard, we assume that aggregate
dividends correspond to aggregate consumption, Dt = Ct. The assumption
of two states can provide a simple, yet realistic, description of how economic
agents process information in reality: agents are, by nature, are mostly
influenced by the qualitative aspects (good versus bad) of new information
more than by the precise quantitative data.
We consider two groups of agents who have different psychological at-
titudes: they can be optimistic or pessimistic. They have access to the
same information yt, but they bias their beliefs so that the optimistic agents
tend to believe that good periods are more likely and the pessimistic ones
bias their beliefs so to increase the probability of the economy being in a
low-mean state.
Let T be the set of natural numbers. At time t ∈ T, the history of realiza-
tions of the consumption growth, yt = {y0, y1, ...yt} , is a commonly available
information: agents observed the state and update their beliefs about the
next observation. The subjective beliefs of agent i are defined by the vector
πit =
[
πit (h) π
i
t (l)
]
, where πit (l) = 1 − πit (h) = probi
(
St+1 = l|yt
)
is
the prior probability of state l in period t+ 1 according to agent i after she
observes yt. The full-bayesian prior belief of state s in time t+ 1 is defined
as
7
πt (s) =
∑
j∈{h,l}
pjs1{j}.
Brandt et al. (2004) provide a simple way to model subjective attitudes:
the optimistic belief of the high-mean state, πot , is defined as:
πot (h)=(1− ωo)πt (h)+ωo
where ωo∈ (0, 1) is a parameter which measures the degree of the optimistic
distortion. Similarly, the pessimistic belief is described as
πpt (h)=(1− ωp)πt (h)
where ωp∈ (0, 1) . The definitions of πot (l) and πpt (h) follow immediately. It
is also easy to check that πot (h) can be obtained by distorting the belief
about the transition probabilities:
πot (s) =
∑
j∈{h,l}
pojs1{j},
where
pohh = (1− ωo)phh+ωo
and
polh = (1− ωo) (1− pll) + ωo.
We can, therefore, think of the optimistic (pessimistic) agents also as those
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Figure 1: Optimistic (blue lines) and pessimistic (red lines) distortions of beliefs.
who consider the good (bad) states more persistent. Figure 1 shows the
effect of the distortion of the belief of the high growth state, plotted on the
x-axis. The optimistic (pessimistic) beliefs are always above (below) the
45-degree line and the greater are the distortion parameters, ωo and ωp, the
farther are the subjective beliefs from the unbiased ones.
Agents’ optimization problem We can find the equilibrium alloca-
tion by posing a Pareto problem for a fictitious social planner, who attaches
nonnegative Pareto weights λi, i = o, p on the consumers and maximizes the
social utility function W :
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W = λoUo + λpUp (2)
where Ui is the agent i
′s utility functional:
Ui = E
i
0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
Cit
)
(3)
=
∞∑
t=0
∑
yt
βtprobi
(
yt|y0
)
u
(
Cit
(
yt
))
,
where Ei0 is the mathematical expectation operator conditioned on y0, and
probi
(
yt|y0
)
represents the agent i′s conditional probability of observing the
realized history yt prior to any observation. We assume that trading occurs
after observing y1, and we set prob
i
(
y0|y0
)
= 1. The utility function u (·) is
supposed to be identical among agents. Furthermore, u (·) is an increasing
concave function of consumption C ≥ 0 and satisfies the Inada conditions.
The maximization is subject to the time t, history yt budget constraint:
∑
i∈{o,p}
Cit
(
yt
)
= (4)
=
∑
i∈{o,p}
{
2∑
m=1
[(
Pmt
(
yt
)
+Dmt
(
yt
))
xi,mt−1
(
yt−1
)− Pmt (yt)xi,mt (yt)]
}
,
where xi,mt
(
yt
)
denotes the quantity of asset m chosen by the investor i at
time t, Pmt
(
yt
)
and Dmt
(
yt
)
are the time t price and the paid dividend of
asset m, respectively. Markets clear when
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Cot
(
yt
)
+ Cpt
(
yt
)
= Ct
(
yt
)
= Dt
(
yt
)
,∀t ∈ T, (5)
xo,mt
(
yt
)
+ xp,mt
(
yt
)
= 1,∀t ∈ T, m = 1, 2,
where Cot
(
yt
)
and Cpt
(
yt
)
are the consumption allocations among the op-
timists and pessimists, respectively, while Ct
(
yt
)
and Dt
(
yt
)
denote the
aggregate consumption and the aggregate dividend.
Let μt
(
yt
)
be a nonnegative multiplier on the budget constraint. The
Lagrangian of the optimization problem (2)-(3) can then be formed:
L =
∞∑
t=0
∑
yt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∑
i∈{o,p}
{
λiβ
tprobi
(
yt|y0
)
u
(
Cit
(
yt
))}
+
+μt
(
yt
)
⎛
⎜⎝∑i∈{o,p}
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∑M
m=1
[
Pmt
(
yt
)
xi,mt−1
(
yt−1
)
+Dmt
(
yt
)
xi,mt−1
(
yt−1
)
−Pmt
(
yt
)
xi,mt
(
yt
)]− Cit (yt)
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
⎞
⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
The first order conditions of maximizing L with respect to Cit
(
yt
)
and xi,mt(
yt
)
are
λiβtprobi
(
yt|y0
)
u′
(
Cit
(
yt
))
= μt
(
yt
)
, (6a)
μt
(
yt
)
Pmt
(
yt
)
=
∑
yt+1
μt+1
(
yt+1
) (
Pmt+1
(
yt+1
)
+Dmt+1
(
yt+1
))
, (6b)
∀m,∀i,∀t. Substituting eq. (6a) into eq. (6b) we have:
Pmt
(
yt
)
= β
∑
yt+1
probi
(
yt+1|yt) u′
(
Cit+1
(
yt+1
))
u′
(
Cit (y
t)
) (Pmt+1 (yt+1)+Dmt+1 (yt+1)) .
(7)
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In order to solve for prices we need to determine the equilibrium consumption
shares or the ratio of the multipliers. Indeed, from eq. (6a), we derive the
following condition on the ratio of multipliers:
probo
(
yt|y0
)
u′
(
Cot
(
yt
))
probp (yt|y0)u′ (Cpt (yt))
=
λp
λo
.
At time t = 0, the above condition implies that λ
p
λo =
u′(Co0 (y0))
u′(Cp0 (y0))
. If we assume
that the initial consumption shares of the two groups of agents are equal,
we have:
probo (yt+1|yt)
u
′ (
Cot+1
(
yt+1
))
u
′
(Cot (y
t))
= probp (yt+1|yt)
u′
(
Cpt+1
(
yt+1
))
u′ (Cpt (yt))
,
or
u
′ (
Cot+1
(
yt+1
))
u′
(
Cpt+1 (y
t+1)
) = probp (yt+1|yt)
probo (yt+1|yt)
u
′ (
Cot
(
yt
))
u′ (Cpt (yt))
, (8)
so that the optimal allocations are characterized by the property that, be-
tween any two commodities, all consumers share a common marginal rate of
substitution. By backward substitution, we derive the fundamental equation
for characterizing long-run equilibrium consumption:
u′
(
Cot
(
yt
))
u′ (Cpt (yt))
=
u′ (Co0 (y0))
u′ (Cp0 (y0))
probp
(
yt|y0
)
probo (yt|y0) . (9)
When equal initial consumption shares are considered,1 eq. (9) simplifies
1Robustness studies have been conducted with different initial consumption endowment
share. Results do not change significantly.
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to:
u′
(
Cot
(
yt
))
u′ (Cpt (yt))
=
probp
(
yt|y0
)
probo (yt|y0) . (10)
Then we can write:
u′
(
Cot
(
yt
))
=
probp
(
yt|y0
)
probo (yt|y0) u
′ (Cpt (yt))
=
probp
(
yt|y0
)
probo (yt|y0) u
′ (Ct (yt)−Cot (yt)) .
In order to facilitate the comparison with similar studies and for its tractabil-
ity, we consider the well known isoelastic CRRA utility functional:
u
(
Cot
(
yt
))
=
(
Cot
(
yt
))1−α − 1
1− α ,
where α denotes the constant Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
The equilibrium condition on consumption shares then becomes:
Cot
(
yt
)
=
[
probp
(
yt|y0
)
probo (yt|y0)
]− 1
α [
Ct
(
yt
)− Cot (yt)] . (11)
Denoting the ratio of beliefs of the representative agents of each group at
time t,
probp(yt|y0)
probo(yt|y0) , with ηt
(
yt
)
, we can rewrite eq. (11) as follows:
Cot
(
yt
)
= η
− 1
α
t
(
yt
) [
Ct
(
yt
)− Cot (yt)] (12)
=
1
η
1
α
t (y
t) + 1
Ct
(
yt
)
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and
Cpt
(
yt
)
= Ct
(
yt
)− Cot (yt) = η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
η
1
α
t (y
t) + 1
Ct
(
yt
)
, (13)
which define the equilibrium shares of consumptions. As a direct consequence
of Pareto optimality, the allocation of resources is optimal: each type of
agents consumes more in the state which is considered more likely. The
ratio of beliefs, ηt, indeed, summarizes the relative performance of the two
representative agents: it is the ratio of the product of the probabilities
that the two groups have attributed to the real observations. Furthermore,
we observe that the consumption share depends exclusively on the ratio of
beliefs and on the risk aversion parameter. Figure 2 plots the consumption
share of the optimistic agent, xot =
Cot (yt)
Ct(yt)
, as a function of the ratio of beliefs
for different values of risk aversion. Higher risk aversion parameters smooth
the consumption share as a function of the ratio of beliefs. When traders are
nearly risk neutral, they take more extreme asset positions, so those with
incorrect beliefs will be driven out of the market soon. In the extreme case
of risk neutrality, the optimistic agent would consume everything for values
of ηt less than one, while he would get nothing for values of ηt greater then
unity, when all the aggregate consumption would be allocated among the
pessimistic ones.
The equilibrium conditions (7), (12), and (13) allow us to determine the
equilibrium prices and allocations. From the perspective of the optimistic
agents, the equilibrium conditions for the price-dividend ratio of the asset
m,
Pmt
Dt
, is given by the following fixed-point recursive equations, where ϕmt =
14
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Figure 2: Share of the optimistic agent as a function of ηt.
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Pmt
Dt
: 2
ϕ1t = β
(
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)−α
×
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
πot (h)
([
πpt (h)
πot (h)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yh)
[
1 + ϕ1t+1
]
+
πot (l)
([
πpt (l)
πot (l)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yl)ϕ1t+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
and
ϕ2t = β
(
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)−α
×
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
πot (l)
([
πpt (l)
πot (l)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yl)
[
1 + ϕ2t+1
]
+
πot (h)
([
πpt (h)
πot (h)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yh)ϕ2t+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
If agents did not distort their beliefs or if they had homogeneous beliefs
(ηt = 1, ∀t), πt would be the only state variable needed to solve the dynamics
of the model. In this case, the equilibrium price-dividend function would be
a time constant function of the state beliefs:
ϕmt = ϕ
m (πt) .
Heterogeneity of beliefs, on the contrary, implies that in each period t, a
new value of ηt realizes so that the equilibrium price-dividend function is
now a function of the stochastic variable ηt :
2Calculus details can be found in the Appendix A 1.
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ϕmt = ϕ
m (ηt, πt;ω
o, ωp)
Numerically, this requires solving the functional equations for ϕmt for the
state πt for each time t, taking ηt as given. Numerical solutions such as
Chebyshev collocation methods are quite fast to use and, therefore, suitable
also in case of heterogeneity3.
2.1 Long-Run Dynamics
In this section we are interested in understanding the long-run dynamics of
the ratio of beliefs, and, therefore, of the consumption share. We impose that
heterogeneity among agents persists in the long run to formalize the idea that
different opinions and attitudes among the agents are always present and do
not characterize only a short-run condition of the economy. In order to model
such persistence, we need to impose that both representative agents are
equally wrong about the realization of the consumption observations. In the
long run, with t → ∞, we can take advantage of the following implications:
1. The full-Bayesian belief of the high-growth state, πt (h) , converges to
the unconditional probability, π (h) = 1−pll2−phh−pll ;
2. Individual beliefs can be expressed in terms of the stationary proba-
bility:
3Matlab code is available upon request.
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πo (h) = [(1− ωo) π (h) + ωo] ,
πp (h) = [(1− ωp)π (h)] ,
so that we can think of πo (h) and πp (h) as the individual unconditional
probabilities of the high-growth state;
3. The evolution of the ratio of beliefs takes the following form:
ηt =
probp
(
yt|y0)
probo (yt|y0) =
[probp (yh)]
prob(yh)t [probp (yl)]
prob(yl)t
[probo (yh)]
prob(yh)t [probo (yl)]
prob(yl)t
(14)
=
[πp (h)]π(h)t [πp (l)]π(l)t
[πo (h)]π(h)t [πo (l)]π(l)t
= (η∗)t .
Imposing long run survival of both groups implies η∗ = 1 and allows us
to compute ωp as a function of ωo, so to study the implications of the
persistent deviation from the full rationality framework while, technically,
keeping limited the number of parameters in the model: for each value of
the distortion of the optimistic agent, ωo, we can derive the corresponding
pessimistic distortion such that, in the long run, both types of agents survive.
This implies that our model involves only one additional degree of freedom
to the standard expected utility framework.
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we estimate a simple two-states mean Markov switching
model for the consumption growth process observed in the postwar sample:
18
log
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
= μξt + 	t,
with
	t ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
,
and ξt being a 2-states Markov chain whose transition matrix has diagonal
terms phh and pll.
We then use these values to characterize the dynamics of our simplified
two-state discrete version model (1) in a way that is made precise below. Ta-
ble 1 shows the Maximum-Likelihood estimates for the consumption growth
process using quarterly US economy data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) website4. The high-growth state is more persistent and the
unconditional probability that the economy finds itself in the high-growth
state is higher (π (h) = 0.845).
4A summary of data is available in the Appendix A 2.
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μh μl σ phh pll
0.7244
(0.08)
−0.1999
(0.18)
0.0021
(9.2e−06)
0.9611
(0.0022)
0.8103
(0.0059)
Table 1: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates. Personal Consumption Expenditure
(PCE) quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2009:4. Columns 1-3 are expressed in per-
centage terms. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 3: Locus of combinations of ωo and ωp such that η∗ = 1 in the long run.
Such asymmetry among the states is reflected in the long-run relation
between the distortions of the individual beliefs which makes sure that ηt
is equal to 1 in the long run: Figure 3 depicts such relation and shows
that for a given value of ωo, a considerably lower value of the pessimistic
distortion is found. In other words, since the economy finds itself in the high-
growth state more times, the optimistic believers distort more their beliefs
compared to the distortion of the pessimists. If the pessimistic distortion
was higher, those beliefs would be driven out of the market because they
would be wrong more times than the optimists and the long term ratio of
the beliefs, η∗, would become smaller than unity, a possibility that we rule
out.
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In order to derive the implied price series, we need to discretize the real
observations so to make them compatible with our simple discrete model. A
natural choice is to consider the observation yt as yh (yl) if yt < yμ (yt > yμ) ,
where yμ is the value corresponding to the inverse cumulative function such
that
prob (yt < yμ) = π (l) ,∀t.
In each time t, given ηt and πt, the model can generate the implied
consumption shares and equilibrium prices. Figure 4 presents a comparative
graph where the dynamics of the optimistic share is plotted for different
values of the distortion ωo.
Higher levels of distortion imply more significant switching among con-
sumption shares. In the extreme case of no distortion, consumption shares
are constant and equal to 0.5. Figure 5 shows a similar comparative exer-
cise, where equilibrium shares and prices are plotted for different values of
distortions (vertically) and risk aversion (inside each panel).
As already noted above, risk aversion smooths the dynamics of the
switching of the consumption share for different levels of risk aversion while
higher levels of distortions have the opposite effect. Price-dividend ratios
appear to be very sensitive to the switching of shares if risk aversion is low.
High biases in beliefs and low risk aversion are able to imply very volatile
prices, which appear very low (even implausible negative for some combi-
nations of the parameters) in periods in which pessimists get the biggest
consumption share and very high in growth periods.
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Figure 4: Time series of share of the optimistic agent for different intensities of
distortion. (α = 4.5, β = 0.995).
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Figure 5: Comparative analysis of consumption shares and price-dividend ratios
for different risk aversion and intensity of distortion parameters. (β = 0.995).
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The implications of the model in terms of prices for different values
of risk aversion and distortions can be directly compared with real data.
Low levels of risk aversion can produce very volatile prices in presence of
heterogeneity. This suggests that heterogeneity plays an important role
towards the explanation of the equity premium puzzle because even with
small risk aversion the model is able to generate price fluctuations close to
the observed ones. Figures 6 and 7 show such comparisons and present the
correlation coefficient between data and the implied series for several values
of risk aversion and make clear that the presence of heterogeneity of beliefs
amplifies the effect of low values of risk aversion, helping in matching the
medium term fluctuations. Such effect would not be captured in a similar
simple model with homogeneous beliefs.
We also observe that there is substitutability between risk aversion and
distortion: higher risk aversion produces lower but less volatile price-dividend
ratios, while higher distortion in beliefs causes prices to be lower and more
volatile. This fact suggests that high values of distortion in beliefs can sub-
stitute risk aversion so that a good matching of the series can be obtained
with low values of risk aversion. Heterogeneity in this sense can help in re-
solving the equity premium puzzle: low price-dividend ratios usually imply
expected higher returns.
As a baseline case, we choose a calibration which appears quite satisfac-
tory in matching the level and the medium-long term fluctuations in prices,
where we set α equal to 8 and ωo equal to 0.8. Figure 8 shows the com-
parison between the data (green dashed line) and the implied prices (blue
solid line). We also show the implied series with the same level of risk
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Figure 6: Implied price-dividend ratio for different values of risk aversion. The
dashed green line represents the observed series. (ωo = 0.9, β = 0.995).
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Figure 7: Implied price-dividend ratio for different values of distortions. The green
dashed line represents the observed series. (α = 10, β = 0.995).
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Figure 8: Implied and observed price-dividend ratios. The red dashed line repre-
sents the implied serie with no distortion in beliefs. The green dashed line represents
the observed series. (α = 8, ωo = 0.8, γ = 1, β = 0.995).
aversion without heterogeneity in beliefs (red dashed line). The correlation
coefficient, ρ, is 0.5580, that can be considered quite satisfactory given the
simplistic structure of the model.
The corresponding dynamics of the share of the optimists is represented
in Figure 9. Clearly, the dynamics of the shares among agents determines
the waves of prices: when the optimistic group is the majority, their con-
sumption shares cause prices to increase and the reverse happens when the
pessimistic share is the greatest. At the beginning of the year 2010, the share
of the optimistic is still greater than the pessimistic one, but it is rapidly
decreasing. We know that during the current prolonged financial distress,
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Figure 9: Share of the optimistic agents. ( α = 8, ωo = 0.8, γ = 1, β = 0.995)).
in the first half of 2011, there has been a lot of uncertainty regarding the
consumers’ sentiment and the possibility of a new fast recovery. The fig-
ures suggests, however, that fast recovery in the economy and in consumers’
sentiment has been experienced after years of extreme pessimism, as if it
is likely to observe still unstable periods of recession before experiencing a
new stable optimism view of the economy.
We conclude that this simple model is able to imply persistent effects
of changing confidence levels and can be thought as a simple formalized
counterpart of the idea of confidence multiplier of Akerlof and Shiller (2009):
”Changes in confidence will result in changes in income and confidence in
the next round, and each of these changes will in turn affect income and
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confidence in yet further rounds” (p. 16).
4 Testable moments restrictions
In this section we focus on the testability of the equilibrium conditions of
the model simple moment conditions that can be derived from the model
with heterogeneous expectations. Let M be the set of assets. From (7), the
time t price of an asset m ∈ M must satisfy the following Euler for agent i :
1 = βEit
[(
Cit
Cit+1
)−α
Rmt+1
]
,m ∈ M, i ∈ {o, p} and t ∈ T, (15)
where Rmt+1 =
Pmt+1+D
m
t+1
Pmt
is the gross return of asset m.
Substituting the share of optimistic agent, eq. (15) becomes:
1 = βEot
⎡
⎣( (ηt) 1α + 1
(ηt+1)
1
α + 1
)−α(
Ct+1
Ct
)−α
Rmt+1
⎤
⎦
= βEotf
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
,
where yt+1 = log
Ct+1
Ct
. It follows that
1 = βEotf
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
(16)
= β
∑
yt+1
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
probo
(
yt+1|yt
)
.
It is easy to show that
probo
(
yt+1|yt
)
= (1− ωo) prob (yt+1|yt)+ ωoprob (yt+1|St+1 = h) , (17)
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where prob
(
yt+1|yt
)
is the full-Bayesian probability5. Substituting this def-
inition in (16) gives the condition:
1 =
∑
yt+1
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
) {
(1− ωo) prob (yt+1|yt)+ ωoprob (yt+1|St+1 = h)} ,
(18)
in which we need to work out more explicitly the term prob (yt+1|St+1 = h) .
By the properties of the conditional probabilities the following equalities can
be derived:
prob (yt+1|St+1 = h) = prob (yt+1, St+1 = h)
prob (St+1 = h)
(19)
=
prob (St+1 = h|yt+1) prob (yt+1)
prob (St+1 = h)
=
πt+1,t+1 (h) prob (yt+1)
π (h)
,
so that substituting the term back into (18) we have:
1 =
∑
yt+1
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
){
(1− ωo) prob (yt+1|yt)+ ωoπt+1,t+1 (h) prob (yt+1)
π (h)
}
= (1− ωo)
∑
yt+1
prob
(
yt+1|yt
)
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
+ωo
∑
yt+1
prob (yt+1) f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
) πt+1,t+1 (h)
π (h)
= (1− ωo)Etf
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
+
ωo
π (h)
Ef
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
πt+1,t+1 (h) .
5See Appendix A 3 for details.
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Let zt be a q-dimensional vector of instrumental variables that are in the
agents’ information set. The equilibrium condition in terms of unconditional
expectations can be defined as follows:
zt = (1− ωo)Et
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)⊗ zt}+
+
ωo
π (h)
E
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
πt+1,t+1 (h)
}⊗ zt,
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product and πt+1,t+1 (h) is the full-Bayesian
posterior probability of the high-mean state, at time t + 1, after observing
yt+1, , that is, πt+1,t+1 (h) = prob
[
St+1 = h | yt+1
]
. Taking the uncondi-
tional expectation of both sides, we have:
0 = E
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− ωo)Et
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)⊗ zt}+
+ ω
o
π(h)E
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
πt+1,t+1 (h)
}⊗ zt − zt
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭
= (1− ωo)E{f (ηt+1, yt+1, Rmt+1)⊗ zt}+
+
ωo
π (h)
E
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
πt+1,t+1 (h)
}⊗ Ezt − Ezt
and the sample equivalent of the equilibrium condition can be defined as:
0 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− ωo){f (ηt+1, yt+1, Rmt+1)⊗ zt}+
+ ω
o
π(h)
{
f
(
ηt+1, yt+1, R
m
t+1
)
πt+1,t+1 (h)
}⊗ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt − zt
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ .
In our model the ratio of beliefs, ηt+1, is a constant function of yt+1.
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Indeed,
ηt+1 =
t+1∏
j=1
probp (yj |yj−1)
t+1∏
j=1
probo (yj|yj−1)
so that, at each time t, ηt is known and a function of yt given the distortion
parameters.
Therefore, the Generalized Method of Moments testable condition can
be written as:
0 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(1− ωo) f (yt+1, Rmt+1;ωo)⊗ zt+
ωo
π(h)f
(
yt+1, R
m
t+1;ω
o
)
πt+1,t+1 (h)⊗ 1T
∑T
t=1 zt − zt
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭ .
In order to estimate the parameters α, ωo and β, we use the nondurable plus
services series of personal consumption expenditure, available at the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) website. Nominal market returns and risk free
rates are available in the CRSP website. We used quarterly data from 1947:2
to 2009:2. Nominal values are converted into real quantities by dividing by
the implicit price deflator associated with the consumption series6.
We consider different combinations of instrumental variables, made of
lagged values of consumption and lagged returns. A first round of consis-
tent but inefficient estimates is obtained using the identity matrix as the
weighting matrix. The consistent estimates are used to construct the ef-
ficient weighting matrix. Table 2 reports the estimates, the column DF
6A detailed description of the data is in the Appendix A 2.
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denotes the degrees of freedom or the number of overidentifying restrictions,
and prob represents the probability that a χ2 (DF ) random variate is less
than the computed value of the test statistic under the hypothesis that the
model equilibrium conditions are satisfied.
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INST α ωo β DF Prob
const; y−1; y−2;R−1 3.0991
(5.0869)
0.1000
(0.0505)
0.9925
(0.0329)
1 0.9268
const; y−1;y−2;R−1 ∗ y−1;R−1 ∗ y−2 3.1055
(13.1846)
0.1000
(0.2269)
0.9900
(0.0761)
2 0.1729
const; y2−1;R
2
−1;R
2
−1 ∗ y2−1 3.0986
(17.1676)
0.1000
(0.2652)
0.9902
(0.1069)
1 0.1981
const; y2−1;R2−1;;y2−1 ∗R2−1; y2−2 3.0995
(17.0850)
0.1000
(0.2651)
0.9901
(0.1064)
2 0.1497
Table 2: Generalized Methods of Moments estimates with overidentified condi-
tions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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INST α ωo β
const; y−1;R−1 3.0995
(5.1169)
0.1000
(0.0581)
0.9923
(0.0330)
const; y−1;y−2 3.1070
(13.3396)
0.1000
(0.2599)
0.9898
(0.0766)
const; y2−1; y
2
−2 3.0797
(61.9299)
0.1000
(2.7636)
0.9901
(0.5304)
const; y2−1;R2−1 3.0885
(17.4155)
0.1640
(0.4155)
0.9862
(0.1208)
Table 3: Generalized Methods of Moments estimates in the case of exactly
identification. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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The estimates of α, ωo and β appear similar in the different cases. The
J -test suggests that the model is correctly specified. However, the standard
errors of the risk aversion parameter are usually very high. We should re-
call, indeed, that we are considering a standard utility specification, where
the risk aversion parameter is constrained to be the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution. Such tension has been emphasized in the literature and,
starting from Epstein and Zin (1989), more flexible frameworks have been
provided. However, we do not address this issue here: we want to concen-
trate exclusively on the role of distortion of beliefs and we keep the model
as simple as possible in order to make the interpretation easier. The esti-
mates of the distortion parameter are usually positive, but not extremely
high. Requiring the discount factor to be less than unity, is, in most cases, a
binding constraint. This feature is common among expected utility models
suggesting that this framework have some problems in fitting the levels of
asset returns. Similar results are obtained in case of exact identification,
which is summarized in Table 3.
5 Conclusions
We propose a simple asset pricing model with (risk averse) heterogeneous
agents. Heterogeneity is modelled in a very simple way, captured by one
single parameter. In this way, we want to propose a practical alternative
to complex heterogeneous agents models, which, starting from Brock and
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Hommes (1997), have been able to imply interesting and complex price dy-
namics at the expenses of the robustness of the validation: such models,
indeed, often rely on numerous parameters which are usually calibrated.
Furthermore, we are not only interested in the ability of the model to pro-
duce realistic dynamics (like waves of optimism and pessimism, volatility
clustering, etc.), but we would also like to build a model which allows to
reproduce the observed price-dividend ratios during the postwar sample.
Agents have access to the same information, but they interpret it with
different attitudes: the optimistic group believes that good times are more
likely than full-Bayesian learners would, while the pessimists increase the
probability of bad times happening. In order to control the effect of such
types of heterogeneity, we consider a simple complete market: in our econ-
omy, there are two possible states and two Arrow-Debreu assets which pay
the aggregate dividend if a specific predefined state of nature realizes. A key
assumption of our model is that heterogeneity is not going to be resolved:
pessimists and optimists are equally wrong about the probability of future
states of nature, they both survive in the long run so that prices reflect the
temporary deviation from the long-run persistence of heterogeneity.
The model is able to reproduce the waves of optimism and pessimism
observed in the dynamics of asset prices. The amplitude of such waves
is influenced by the risk aversion parameter and the distortion in beliefs
formation imposed on the agents. Low levels of risk aversion determine a
noticeable amplification effect which is peculiar to the case of an economy
with heterogeneous agents: risk neutral investors tend to make more extreme
investment decisions, which, if based on wrong beliefs, lead them to be
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driven out of the market. Furthermore, the more agents are (equally) wrong
about the probabilities of future realizations, the more price fluctuations are
volatile. This suggests that heterogeneity in the form of persistent different
attitudes is relevant in understanding the main forces driving asset prices
and can constitute a useful alternative to the existing heterogeneity models
in terms of robustness and validation.
We also present an attempt to estimate the model with GMM methods
and we show that it is possible to derive testable moment conditions.
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A Appendix
A.1 The price-dividend ratio
We consider the price function (7) in terms of the optimistic agent and we
substitute on it the utility function form and eq. (12) for Cot :
Pmt
(
yt
)
= β
∑
yt+1
probo (yt+1|yt)
u′
(
Cot+1
(
yt+1
))
u′ (Cot (yt))
(
Pmt+1
(
yt+1
)
+Dmt+1
(
yt+1
))
, (20)
= β
∑
yt+1
probo (yt+1|yt)
(
Cot+1
(
yt+1
))−α
(Cot (y
t))−α
(
Pmt+1
(
yt+1
)
+Dmt+1
(
yt+1
))
,
= β
∑
yt+1
probo (yt+1|yt)
(
1
(ηt+1(yt+1))
1
α+1
Dt+1
(
yt+1
))−α
(
1
(ηt(yt))
1
α+1
Dt (yt)
)−α (Pmt+1 (yt+1)+Dmt+1 (yt+1)) ,
= β
∑
yt+1
probo (yt+1|yt)
⎛
⎝ η 1αt (yt)+ 1
η
1
α
t+1 (y
t+1) + 1
⎞
⎠
−α
×
×
(
Dt+1
(
yt+1
)
Dt (yt)
)−α (
Pmt+1
(
yt+1
)
+Dmt+1
(
yt+1
))
,
where Dmt+1 (j) = Dt+1 if m = 1 (2) , ∧ j = h (l) , zero otherwise.
Dividing both sides by Dt and denoting with ϕ
k
t = P
k
t /Dt the price-
dividend ratio we get
ϕmt = β
(
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)−α
× (21)
×
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
πot (j)
([
πpt (j)
πot (j)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yj)
[
1 + ϕmt+1
]
+
πot (k)
([
πpt (k)
πot (k)
] 1
α
η
1
α
t
(
yt
)
+ 1
)α
exp((1− α) yk)ϕmt+1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
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for j = k,∀m.
A.2 Data description
We have used quarterly real observations. Consumption is derived using
the quarterly series of Personal Consumption Expenditure from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) website. Value weighted portfolio returns are
from the CRSP dataset. Nominal values are deflated using the Implicit
Price Deflator relative to the consumption series from the BEA website.
Data span the period 1947:2-2010:2.
A.3 Appendix
We present here the algebraic steps which prove the equivalence stated in
eq. (17):
probo
(
yt+1|yt
)
= prob (yt+1|St+1 = h)πot (h) + prob (yt+1|St+1 = l) πot (l)
= prob (yt+1|St+1 = h) [(1− ωo)πt (h) + ωo] +
prob (yt+1|St+1 = l) [(1− ωo) πt (l)]
= prob (yt+1|St+1 = h) (1− ωo) πt (h) +
prob (yt+1|St+1 = l) [(1− ωo) πt (l)] +
ωoprob (yt+1|St+1 = h)
= (1− ωo) [prob (yt+1|St+1 = h) πt (h) + prob (yt+1|St+1 = l) πt (l)] +
ωoprob (yt+1|St+1 = h)
= (1− ωo) prob (yt+1|yt)+ ωoprob (yt+1|St+1 = h) .
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